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111. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
Appellant Warren Yadon, (hereinafter "Warren Yadon") and Respondent

Kim Yadon were husband and wife at the time of this transaction. Together they
purchased a piece of property known as "the Montgomery farim" in 1994, and held
legal title to the property by warranty deed as husband and wife. Warren Yadon
filed for divorce froin Kim Yadon in the spring of 2008, and the divorce was
finalized on December 18, 2008. In August of 2008, Kiln Yadon's parents
George and JoAnn Kelley (hereinafter "the Kelleys") filed a lawsuit against
Warren and Kiln Yadon claiming an ownership interest in the Montgolnery farin
by constructive or resulting trust.

B. Course of Proceedinr~s
The Kelleys filed a Complaint against Warren and Kim Yadon on August
25,2008. R. Vol. I , pg. 22. At the time, Warren Yadon had just filed for divorce
fi-om Kiln Yadon. Warren Yadon fifed an Answer and Counter Petition for

eviction on September 8, 2008. R. Vol. 1, pg. 36. Warren Yadon filed a motion

for summary
judgment
on
December 29,2008,
requesting that
the trial court find
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that there was no genuine issue of fact on Kelleys' theories of constructive trust

-_---

__

and resulting trust. R. Vol. I., pg. 125. The Kelleys filed a memorandum in
opposition to summary judgment on January 15,2009. R. Vol. I., pg. 212. The
Kelleys did not file an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment, and instead
stipulated to rely upon deposition excerpts quoted in their memorandum in
opposition. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 14,ll. 10-25, pg. 15,ll. 1-3. The trial court called up
Warren Yadon's motion for summary judgment for hearing on February 5,2009,
accepted oral argument on the motion for summary judgment and took the matter
under advisement. R. Vol. 2, pg. 244. On February 12, 2009, the trial court
issued its Memorandum Decision Denying Warren Yadon's Motion for Summary
Judgment. R. Vol. 2, 245.
This matter then came up for bench trial on March 30,2009. Tr. Vol. 1, pg.
55, 11. 1-5. The trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
June 4, 2009, denying the Kelleys' claim under constructive trust but imposing a
resulting trust in favor of the Kelleys. R. Vol. 2, pg. 39 1. Warren Yadon filed his
notice of appeal to this Court on July 13, 2009. R. Vol. 2, pg. 447.

C. Statement of Facts
In 1990, plaintiff George Kelley testified that he negotiated with Esther
Montgomery regarding the possibility of purchasing her farm, which is commonly
known as the "Montgomery Farm." R. Vol. 2, pg. 392; Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 82, 11. 1215. George Kelley testified that Esther Montgomery wanted cash for the farm,
and that he didn't have the money so he went to Ray Commons for help. Ray
4

Commons agreed to purchase the Montgomery Farm, in his name, and give
George Kelley an option to purchase. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 83,ll. 8-15. George Kelley
testified that he entered into a Fann Lease with Option to Purchase with
Commons Farms. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 84,ll. 15-25.
George Kelley testified that in 1992, when the option to purchase was about
to expire, he believed that he would not be able to get financing to exercise the
option to purchase on the Montgomery Farm due to credit problems, Chapter 11
bankruptcy, and IRS tax liens. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 127,ll. 2-5. George Kelley testified
that in 1992, he transferred his option to purchase the Montgomery farm to
Warren and Kim Yadon. Tr. Vol 1, pg. 128, 11. 1-6. On the 4th day of March,
1992, the Kelleys entered into an "Agreement Transferring Option to Purchase
.

-
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to purchase, George Kelley testified that Warren and Kim Yadon assumed a
$40,000.00 debt that Kelley owed to Doc Flanders. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 129, 11. 4-5.
Also on March 4, 1992, Warren and Kim Yadon entered into an agreement
with Doc Flanders called a "Tenants-in-Common Agreement." R. Plaintiffs
Exhibit "9". Under this agreement, the Yadons assigned their newly acquired
"option to purchase" the Montgomery Farm to Doc Flanders so that Doc Flanders
could purchase the property from Commons Farm, Inc.

Id. Doc Flanders

assumed the $117,000.00 loan taken out by Commons Farm, Inc. on the
Montgomery Farm from Farm Credit Services. Id.
As security, Doc Flanders retained a one-half interest in the Montgomery
Farm and transferred the other one-half interest to the Yadons. R. Plaintiff's
Exhibit "7".

The Yadon's agreed that they would repay Doc Flanders the

$1 17,000.00 plus nine (9%) interest as well as the $40,000.00 obligation described
earlier, at which time Doc Flanders would give the Yadons the deed to his onehalf interest in the Montgomery Farm. R. Plaintiff s Exhibit "9". Consequently,
on March 4, 1992, the Yadons took a loan in their names and used the proceeds
to buy a one-half interest in the property from Flanders, who gave them a
-
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In addition, a term of the "Tenants-In-Common

Agreement" was that "the

purpose of the land ownership is to generate income by leasing the same for
farming operations andlor participating in agricultural CRP and set aside programs
to the extent it is appropriate to do so." R. Plaintiff's Exhibit "9". George Kelley
testified that he lcnew in 1992, that he had entered into a written lease agreement
with Doc Flanders, and that he knew Warren and Kim Yadon were one-half
owners of the Montgomery farm with Doc Flanders. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 7-13; R.
Plaintiffs Exhibits "3" and "4"; Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 139, 11. 5-1 1.
On July 20, 1994, the Yadons toolc another loan and purchased Flanders'
share in the farm, thereby becoming the sole title holders to the farm." R. Vol. 2,
pg. 395; R. Plaintiffs Exhibit "10". Paul and Bethany Haynes issued a quitclaim
deed for the Montgomery Farm to the Yadons, to clear title for the Northwest
Farm Credit loan. R. Plaintiff's Exhibit "1 1". As a consequence, on August 4,
1994, Doc Flanders issued a warranty deed to the Yadons transferring the
remaining one-half interest in the Montgomery Farm to the Yadons. R. Plaintiffs
Exhibit "12". Since that time, the trial court found that the Yadons have held sole
legal title to the Montgomery Farm. R. Vol. 2, pg. 393.
.
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with D.L. Evans Bank, for $396,000.00, and granted a mortgage to D.L. Evans

Bank. R. Plaintiff's Exhibit "16,". Since that time, the Yadons have been the sole
legal title holders to the Montgomery farm.
According to George Kelley, there was a meeting that took place at his
attorney's office (Mr. Bill Parsons) in Burley, wherein, the conveyance to the
Yadons was discussed. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 153,ll. 14-25, pg. 154, 11. 1-18. George
Kelley testified that Warren and Kim Yadon were present, along with Mr. Parsons
and George Kelley, and that the parties discussed the purchase of the Montgomery
farm. Id. George Kelley testified that at some point Warren Yadon left the room
and Bill Parsons asked him, "are you okay with this, Kelley?' Id. George Kelley
responded that he was okay with the situation. Id.
George Kelley knew that the status in 1994, was that the Yadons were the
two legal owners of the Montgomery Farm, and that George Kelley was going to
pay the mortgage payments in exchange for continuing to operate the farm. Tr.
Vol. 1, pg. 158, 11. 5-12.
Since that time, the Kelleys have continued to operate the farm, and keep
the profit off the farm. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 157, 11. 2-7 and 24-25; pg. 15, 11. 1-2.
However, even George Kelley testified that there were times when he did not
--
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158, 11. 2 1-25. George Kelley admitted that it could have happened more than

once, and that he doesn't have any idea how many times. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 160,11.
24-25; pg. 161,11. 1-4. Further, George Kelley testified that he repaid the Yadons
for all of the payments he missed, but that it could have taken a few months to get
around to it after he "sold some hay or something later on." Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 161,

11. 16-24. The trial court found that indeed George Kelley was occasionally late
making payments causing the Yadons to have to make a timely payment on their
credit cards or through check protection. R. Vol. 2, pg. 397.
Warren Yadon testified that the Kelleys did not contribute any money to the
purchase price for the Montgoinery farm. Tr. Voi. 1, pg; 303,ll. 10-14; pg. 307,

11. 19-25. The trial court found that in 2004 or 2005 Kim Yadon told her father
that he needed to get the farm out of the Yadons' name, indicating that the
Yadons' marriage was troubled. R. Vol. 2, pg. 397. The trial court found that
Warren Yadon filed for divorce in May, 2008, and that the instant lawsuit was
filed by the Kelleys in August, 2008. Id.
After the lawsuit was filed, Warren Yadon served the Kelleys with a notice
of eviction on September 8, 2008. R. Vol. 2, pg. 397.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
,

.

.._-._.I-

.
...

"On appeal from the grant of a mot~onfor summary judgment, this CouiY'ss---.'-"-''.
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally

ruling on the motion." Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 162 P.3d 772, 774
(2007).

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).
However, "a mere scintilla of evidence or slight doubt as to the facts" is not
sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment. Havpole

v. State, 131 Idaho 437,439,958 P.2d 594,596 (1 998), Petricevich v. Salmon River
Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,871,452 P.2d 362 (1969). The non-moving party "must
respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial." Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150,868
P.2d 473,478 (1994). It is well established that merely asserting the existence of
a factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. There must be

a "genuine issue" and it must exist as to a "material fact." See Gavzee v. Barkley,
121 Idaho, 771, 774, 828 P.2d 334,337 (Ct. App. 1992).

A district court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly
erroneous, although the appellate court exercises free review over conclusions of
--

law. Carney v. Heinson, S33XFBIn0275j985PTZdn 37 '(1999);--"Clearerror"will--------..
not be deemed to exist if the court's findings are supported by substantial and

competent, though conflicting, evidence. Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497, 767
P.2d 1272 (Ct.App.1989). The Supreme Court may substitute its view for that

of the district court on a legal issue. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 946 P.2d
975 (1997).
V. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Did the trial court err in denying Warren Yadon's motion for
summary judgment on the theory of resulting trust, when the Kelleys
failed to establisl~a genuine issue of fact on the element of payment

of the purchase price?

2.

Did the trial court misapply the law with regard to the elements of
resulting trust, specifically, whether the Kelleys paid the purchase
price or incurred an absolute obligation to pay the purchase price?

3.

Did the trial court err in finding that the Kelleys' had established the
elements of resulting trust by clear and convincing evidence at trial?

4.

Did the trial court err in its application of the burden of proof at trial?

5,

Did the trial court err in not granting Warren Yadon's claim for
evictian?

-
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VI. ARGUMENT
With regard to the Kelleys' claiin of resulting trust, the trial court erred in
two regards in the underlying proceedings in this matter. First, the trial court
incorrectly applied the law and standard of review at the summary judgment stage
of proceedings resulting in denial of Warren Yadon's motion for summary
judgment. Second, the trial court incorrectly applied the law and burdens of proof
at trial resulting in the clearly erroneous finding that the Kelleys had established
the elements of a resulting trust. This Court should overturn the trial court's
decisions, and enter summary judgment in favor of Warren Yadon, or in the
alternative, enter an order quieting title to the Montgomery farm in the names of
Warren and Kiln Yadon.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND THATTHE
KELLEYS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A GENUINE ISSUE OF
FACT ON THEIR CLAIM OF RESULTING TRUST AT THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS.

In response to Warren Yadon's motion for summary judgment, the Kelleys
had the burden to come forward with facts sufficient to create a genuine issue of
fact on their claiin of resulting trust. The Kelleys failed to establish any facts to
-

create an issue of fact as to whether they
had paid the purchase price or incurred
...
~

an absolute obligation to pay for the Montgomery farm.

"

~

The trial court

erroneously denied Warren Yadon's motion for summary judgment, and Mr.
Yadon now requests that this Court enter summary judgment in favor of the
Yadons. "On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this
Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court
originally ruling on the motion." Chapin v. Linden, 144Idaho 393,162P.3d 772,

774 (2007).
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Warren Yadon established
facts by affidavit that Warren and Kim Yadon owned the Montgomery farm in fee
simple, and had paid the purchase price for the Montgomery farm as contained in.
the recitals of the deeds to the property. R. Vol. 1, pgs. 149,166 & 168. These
facts, as contained in the affidavit of Warren Yadon, were sufficient to invoke the
presumption under Idaho Law that the holder of legal title is the owner thereof.
The burden of proof then shifted to the Kelleys to create a genuine issue of fact
on each element of their claiin of resulting trust,.in order to rebut the presumption
of ownership by the Yadons.

A resulting trust can arise either (1) where title to property is transferred to
one party, the trustee, although another party, the beneficiary of the trust, paid the

purchase p r i ~ f o ~ t ~ ~ f p f ~ ~ ~ i ;~~le~z~-f~~~et-6-~-r-O-P-ew~isSttannsfee
ty;o'f~2)~~
by gift or devise, with an apparent intent that the donee or devisee is to hold legal
11

title as a trustee in osder for the beneficiary of the trust to enjoy the beneficial
interest in that property." Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 468,469,886 P.2d 772,
775 (1994); citing Russ Balkurd & Family Achievement Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs

Resort, Inc., 97 Tdaho 572, 579, 548 P.2d 72, 79 (1976); see also Hawe v. Hawe,
89 Tdaho 367,376,406 P.2d 106, 1 10 (1965). It has been said of a resulting trust

that:
it never arises out of a contract or agreement that is legally
enforceable, but arises by implication of law from their acts and
conduct apart: from any contract, the law implying a trust where the
acts of the party to be charged as trustee have been such as are in
honesty and fair dealing consistent only with a purpose to hold the
praperty in trust, notwithstanding such party may never have agreed
to the trust and may have really intended to resist it.

Shepherdv. Dougan, 58 Idaho 543,553,76 P.2d 442,445 (1937). In addition, "as
a general rule, a resulting trust arises only where such may reasonably be
presumed to be the intention of the parties as determined from the facts and
ciscurnsta~ncesexisting at the time of the transaction." Hawe,89 Idaho at 109,406
P.2d at 374 (emphasis supplied); citing Shurrum v. Watts, 80 f daho 44, 50, 324

This Court should take particular note of the striking similarity of the facts
-----*-

and legal claims= Heitingo T.~ S ~ 6 ? Z r i d ~ 7 9 8 2 ; t h F - E e t t i ~ g - 5 i ~ m ~ v c d d t ~ - f d
from California, and hoped to purchase the DeHood Dairy, in Jerome County, but

were unable to arrange financing for the purchase. Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 468,
886 P.2d at 773. Mrs. Hettinga's parents (the Sybrandys) verbally agreed to
purchase the dairy and lease the property to the Hettingas for a monthly payment
equal to the payment due on the underlying land sale contract. Id. The Sybrandys
purchased the property in their names. Id. At one point, the dairy was expanded
by purchasing additional land, and that was accomplished by a loan in the name
of the Sybrandys and title was vested in the Sybrandys.

Id. The additional

monthly payments were reimbursed by the Hettingas. Id. All of the personal
property and livestock associated with the dairy operation was purchased by the
Hettingas. Id. In 1991, Mrs. Hettinga filed for divorce from Mr. Hettinga, and
Mr. Hettinga filed a complaint in district court against Mrs. Hettinga and the
Sybrandys seeking a determination of the Hettingas' and the Sybrandys' interests
in the dairy. Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 469,886 P.2d at 774. Mr. Hettinga's claims
were that the relationship between the Hettingas and the Sybrandys created either
a "resulting trust" or a "constructive trust", and that the Hettingas should be
deemed to be the owners of the property despite the lack of a written conveyance
of the property to them. Id.
.~"

On appellate ~ ~ ~ i ~ w ~ ~ ~ ~ s ~ C O U ~ u s tad&-asrkeyexistedatthe--.------t~0nsSide~t~ef
time of the "transaction."

See, Shurrum, 80 Idaho at 50, 324 P.2d at 385. The

"transaction" was a conveyance of the Montgomery Farm from Doc Flanders to
the Yadons in two separate conveyances - the first in 1992 and the second in
1994. R. Vol. 1, pgs. 166 & 168.
This Court should overturn the trial court's denial of summary judgment
because the Kelleys did not establish a genuine issue of fact as to an element of
their claim -that they paid the purchase price for the Montgomery Farm. In order
to establish a genuine issue of material fact that a "resulting trust" arose at the
time of the transfer, plaintiffs had to set forth facts to create an issue of fact that
they "paid the purchase price" for the Montgomery Farm. Hettinga, 126 Idaho at
470, 886 P.2d at 775. The "purchase price7'refersto the monies or consideration
that was delivered to Flanders in exchange for the Montgomery Fann. In

Hettinga, the Court found that the person seeking to establish a resulting trust must
either demonstrate that they paid the purchase price or "incurred an absolute
obligation to pay for the property." Id.
In his brief and affidavits, Warren Yadon established the chain of title
which reveals that Commons Farm, Inc., owned the Montgomery Farm and
conveyed it to Doc Flanders. The consideration paid to Commons Farms, Inc., by
Flanders, was tfie asSUm~tionbTthE-F5KiiiiCrle%;tSerV1~~of-$
117;OOO. 00;-

R. Vol. 1, pg. 157. At that time, the Yadons transferred their option to purchase
14

to Doc Flanders, who came up with the financing to purchase the Montgomery
Farm, and in return, deeded an undivided one-half interest in the farm back to the
Yadons. R. Vol. 1, pg. 166. Two years later, the Yadons purchased Doc
Flanders' remaining one-half interest in the Montgomery Farm with proceeds
from a loan from Northwest Farm Credit Services. R. Vol. 1, pgs. 172 & 203.
The Yadons obtained the loan in their names, delivered the consideration to
Flanders, and in the process "incurred an absolute obligation" to make the loan
payments and gave a mortgage to Northwest Farm Credit. R. Vol. 1, pg. 172. In
so doing, the Yadons paid the "purchase price for the property"or "incurred an
absolute obligation" to pay the purchase price. Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 470, 886
P.2d at 775.
In response to the motion for summary judgment, the Kelleys failed to
establish facts sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact on a necessary element
of their claim of resulting trust - i.e. that they "paid the purchase price" for the
Montgomery Farm. In their memorandum plaintiffs argue generically, "if the
court believes the evidence offered by the Plaintiffs then the court can come to
one result and on the other hand if the court believes the evidence of Yadons it can
-

come to a different result." R . - V 0 r I - ~ ~ p g 7 Z 1 ~ 9 7 I r i i ~ ~ - i - f ~lt-Wo;th
n3onry
parties have established by affidavit conflicting evidence that creates a genuine

issue of fact. What evidence did the Kelleys provide on the issue of who paid the
purchase price? The Kelleys cited portions of the deposition transcript of George
Icelley wherein Mr. Kelley's attorney asked him:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

And part of the deal was that, you know, they got the loan in
their names and it was deeded to them, but you were going to
make the payments, right?
That's right.
And did you actually make the payments?
Yes.

R. Vol. 1, pg. 216. This evidence did not create an issue of fact, but only
corroborated Warren Yadon's position that it was the Yadons who paid the
purchase price with proceeds from a loan in their names. Regardless ofwho made
the loan payments after the transaction was completed, the purchase price had
been paid when the loan proceeds were delivered to Mr. Flanders. Therefore, this
piece of evidence failed to create an issue of fact for trial.
Plaintiffs also supplied the Court with testimony from Warren Yadon in
opposition to summary judgment:

-

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Okay. And you paid Flanders?
Yes.
With your money?
With money that we borrowed.
Froin who?
The bank.

....
Q.

And so it was out of that money that you paid Flanders?

A.

Yes.

R. Vol. 1, pg. 215. This testimony further corroborated and supported Warren

Yadon's position, that the Yadons paid the purchase price for the Montgomery
Farm with proceeds from a loan in their names. Again, this evidence did not
create an issue of fact as to whether or not the Kelleys paid the purchase price.
Plaintiffs also made the argument that "Kelley had the relationships with
Flanders and Commons for which Kelleys then allowed those persons to deal with
Yadons." R. Vol. 1, pg. 220. This allegation is not supported by any fact in the
record. Even if it were, this alleged fact does not create an issue of fact as to any
element required. Plaintiffs then go on to argue that "Yadon comes in and says
'Oh, this is my property because there was a Lease."' R. Vol. I, pg. 220. First,
this alleged quote from Warren Yadon, though it has been presented as a direct
quote, did not appear in any portion of the deposition transcript of Warren Yadon
on record with the trial court. It is a misrepresentation of Mr. Yadon's testimony,
which is that he "acquired the farm" and then leased it to Mr. Kelley under a
verbal agreement. R. Vol. 1, pg. 151. Second, this argument did not create a
genuine issue of fact as to whether the Kelleys paid the purchase price.
-

The Kelleys then argued that Hettingaxo~snot support Warren W O E ' S
position, but instead, supports the Kelleys' position because "Kelley paid all of

the payments and taxes." R. Vol. 1, pg. 222. Plaintiffs kept coming baclc to the
same argument - that they paid the purchase price because they allegedly made
the loan payments. However, there were no facts in the record to establish that the
Kelleys paid the purchase price at the time of the transaction.
Even assuming the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs and giving
them the benefit of the doubt that it was their money that was used to pay the loan
obligation, the contention that they paid the purchase price is simply untenable.
It is axiomatic in the lending industry that a person who takes a loan is actually
purchasing money from the lender, in exchange for an obligation to repay the loan
wit11 interest. This Court has long held that a "purchase price7' for real property
can be paid from "the proceeds of a loan." Lepel v. Lepel, 93 Idaho 82, 86, 456
P.2d 249,253 (1969). The proper legal standard for the trial court to apply is that
the purchase price was paid from the loan proceeds secured by the Yadons in
1994. The reimbursement of loan payments by the Kelleys later on resulted froin
a separate agreement related to the lease of the farm, and did not constitute
payment of the purchase price.
Because the trier of fact in this matter was the trial court, the judge did not
--

-----

--

have to draw all inferences in favor of the non-movmg party, -tKZ ju3ge was
allowed to consider the evidence presented and draw reasonable inferences as he

saw fit based upon the evidence. See, Verbillis v,Dependable Appliance Company,
107 Idaho 335,338,689 P.2d 227,230 (Ct. App. 1984). "The appliance store, in

essence, has urged us to hypothecate a fact . . .. This we cannot do. Motions for
su-lnn~ary
judgment are decided upon the facts shown," Id. The only reasonable
inference of fact in this matter was that Warren and Kim Yadon purchased the
Montgomery Farm with proceeds from a loan obtained in their name, for which
they had the absolute obligation to repay. There was no evidence provided by the
Kelleys that the Ioan was not in the names of the Yadons. There was no evidence
presented by the Kelleys that they somehow '"incurred an absolute obligation" to
pay the purchase price. The trial court erred in finding that there was a genuine
issue of fact as to whom had paid the purchase price. Further, Warren Yadon
requests that this Court make a legal determination that the Kelleys did not incur
an "absolute obligation" to pay the purchase price be making a verbal agreement

to pay the Yadons' loan payments.
This Court should overrule the trial court's denial of summary judgment,
and grant Warren Yadon's motion for summary judgment and quiet title to the
Montgomery farm in the names of Warren and Kiln Yadon.
"--""

----

--- - -- ----

-

-- ---

-

B.

THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW AND ITS
FINDINGS WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUSWITH REGARD TO
THE IMPOSITION OF A RESULTING TRUST.

The trial court misapplied the law of resulting trusts regarding the element
of payment of the purchase price, and in addition, its findings of fact were clearly
erroneous when it found that the Kelleys had actually reimbursed all of the loan
payments made by the Yadons.
The trial court improperlv found that the Kelleys' act of
reimbursinr the loan pavments constituted "payment of the
purchase price" under the theory of resultinp trust.

1.

In general the trial court held that "Idaho law presumes that the holder of
title to real property is the legal owner of that property." Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126
Idaho 467,469, 886 P.2d 772,774 (1994);

citing RUSSBallard & Family

Achievement Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572,579,548 P.2d 72,

79 (1976). The Idaho statute of frauds requires that "all interests in real property
must be accomplished through a writing, signed by the party granting the interest
or that party's agent." Idaho Code
identified that

"

5

9-503. The trial court also correctly

it is a rebuttable presumption that the holder of title to property

is the legal owner of that property." See, Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 469, 886 P.2d at

774. And that "the burden is on the party w h o ~ o p p ~ ~ s S t ~ ~ p ' " S U ~ i o ~ t o
produce evidence to rebut the presumption." See, IRE 301. The trial court also

held that "all interests in real property must be accomplished through a writing,
signed by the party granting the interest or that party's agent." Idaho Code

5 9-

503. Further, the trial court properly distinguished that "although a trust in real
property can arise by implication or operation of law without such a writing, I.C.

5

9-504, a person claiming ownership through such a trust must establish such

claiin by evidence that is clear, satisfactory and convincing." See, Hettinga, 126
Idaho at 469, 886 P.2d at 774.
The legal argument relied upon by the Kelleys at trial - and ultimately
adopted by the trial court - was that the Kelleys paid the purchase price for the
Montgomery farm when they either directly paid or reimbursed the Yadons for all
of the semi-annual loan payments due to Northwest Farm Credit (and subsequent
lenders). R. Vol. 2, pg. 402. This conclusion is a (I) misapplication of law
coupled with a (2) clearly erroneous finding of fact.
First, the trial court misapplied the law when it made a legal determination
that the Kelleys' reiinburseinentlpayinent of the semi-annual loan payments rose
to the level of "paying the purchase price."
The case of Hettinga v. Sybvandy is of paramount importance to this case to
-- --

determine what constitutes p a y m e n t O f i h - F p B a s e price.IngFneral,-the-purchase price is paid when consideration is supplied in exchange for property.

Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 470,886. P.2d at 775; citingshurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44,
54, 324 P.2d 380, 386 (1958). In this matter, the trial court found that in 1992
"the Yadons took a loan in their names and used the proceeds to buy a one-half
interest in the property froin Flanders, who gave thein a quitclaim deed in
exchange." R. Vo1.2, pg. 3. Curiously, in the next sentence, the trial court stated
"the Yadons did not use any of their own money in this transaction." Id. This is
an obvious contradiction, because a person who incurs a loan by written obligation
"owns" the inoney that is given to them by the bank. Therefore, the Yadoils
use their own money, money that they had borrowedpurchased from the bank.
This is a critical misapplication of law by the trial court.
The trial court then found that in 1994, "the Yadons took another loan and
purchased Flanders' share in the farm, thereby becoming the sole title holders to
the farm." R. Vol. 2, pg. 5. The Court's aclmowledgment of these facts should
have ended the analysis of which party paid the purchase price, because at that
time the purchase price had been delivered to Flanders by the Yadons in the form
of money that the Yadons purchased from the bank. It is axiomatic in the lending
industry that a person who takes a loan is actually purchasing inoney from the
--

-- -.
-- .-

- -- -

-

lender, in exchange for an obligation to repay the loan with E r e i t . -TEis-COuT

has long held that a "purchase price" for real property can be paid from "the
proceeds of a loan." Lepel v. Lepel, 93 Idaho 82, 86, 456 P.2d 249, 253 (1969)
However, the trial court went on to find that the Kelleys agreed to an
absolute obligation "to pay the Yadon's loans for the farm". R. Vol. 2, pg. 402.
The trial court said that the existence of this "absolute obligation," which was not
in writing, was credible and corroborated by Kim Yadon's testimony. R. Vol. 2,
pg. 402. The trial court did not indicate which part of Kiln Yadon's testimony
provided the "corroboration7' for that obligation. The trial court went on to say
that evidence established that the Kelleys have performed the agreement. R. Vol.
2, pg. 402.
As to the issue of which party incurred an "absolute obligation" to pay the
loan, the Yadons were the only parties who incurred a written obligation to re-pay
the loan. The Yadons signed a promissory note to repay the loan and gave a
mortgage to Northwest Farm Credit. Signing a promissory note and giving a
mortgage is much more indicative of "incurring an absolute obligation" to re-pay
the loan, than verbally agreeing to reimburse loan payments. The Kelleys did
nothing to bind themselves in writing to make payments on the loan to either the

bank or the Yadons. Th~~~nssWe~~th~Olrm~r'fiFs~61igat:ed-^oii-th~
If for any reason the loan were to have fallen into default, the Yadons were the

ONLY parties on the hook for collection of that debt. Further, the trial court
found that George Kelley "occasionally was late with a payment," and left the
Yadons responsible to come up with the money out of their own pockets. R. Vol.

2, pg. 397. Warren Yadon is requesting that this Court find, as a matter of law,
that verbally agreeing to reimburse a loan payment does NOT.constitute"payment
of the purchase price" or "incurring an absolute obligation" to pay the purchase
price.
The trial court held that "the mixing in and use of Kelley's personal assets
as collateral for the loans taken by the Yadon's is strong evidence in support of
the existence of the "obligation" to repay the loan." R. Vol. 2, pg. 401. However,
the trial court did not cite to any exhibit or piece of testimony to support the claim
that Kelley's personal assets were used as collateral on the loan. The trial court
did indicate that in 2000, the "Yadons refinanced their loan with D.L. Evans
Bank, which included the use of George Kelley's personal property farm and
irrigation equipment located on the Montgomery farm as collateral security for the
loan." R. Vol. 2, pg. 5. However, this finding was inaccurate. A close look at
Plaintiffs' Exhibit "16" reveals that the equipment listed as security on the D.L.

Evans Bank l ~ ~ ~ i ~ 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ h e S a m ~ ~ i p m e ~ t l i s f ~ ~ F n - P 1 ~ i ~ f
which was the document transferring the option to purchase the Montgomery

Farm in 1992. The equipment listed as security in 2000, was never owned by
George Kelley, it came with the Montgomery Farm.
Either way, the 2000 refinance should not have had any effect on the trial
court's analysis of the "payment of the purchase price" because it happened six
years after "the time of the transaction" which was in 1994. And, payment of the
purchase price must be analyzed in connection with the facts in existence at the
time of the transaction. Therefore, there is really no evidence in the record to
substantiate the trial court's statement that Kelley's assets were used as collateral
on the loans. The collateral on the loans was the farm and equipment that came
with the farm. R. Plaintiffs Exhibit "16".
The Hettinga decision is instructive on this issue. InHettinga, the dairy was
purchased by the Sybrandys under a "land sale contract" and the purchase price
was paid by the Sybrandys over time when they "paid all monthly escrow
payments to the escrow holders." Id. In Hettinga, this Court operated under the
assumption that the Sybrandys were the only parties who had "incurred an
absolute obligation to pay the purchase price" presumably because the Hettinga's
were not obligated oil the land sale contract. Even inHettinga, where the purchase
-

_ __--

_

.

.

price was not delivered up front at the tune oTclosing, ana insfeaa was being paid

--

on a monthly installment basis, this Court still declined to impose a resulting trust
where the Hettinga's were reimbursing the monthly installments to the Sybrandys.
Therefore, it was a misapplication of law for the trial court to find that the
Kelleys paid the purchase price for the Montgomery farm by entering into a verbal
agreement to reimburse the Yadons for the loan payments. In the alternative,
Warren Yadon requests that this Court make legal determination that a verbal
agreement to repay a loan in some else's name does not rise to the level of
"incurring an absolute obligntion" to pay the purchase price for the property.
Second, the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that the Kelleys
actually reimbursed all of the semi-annual loan payments, and that there was an
intention on the part of the Yadons to hold the Montgomery farm in trust for the
ICelleys. The burden of proof was on the Kelleys to demonstrate those facts by
clear and convincing evidence. One problem with the Kelleys' position, is that
they never demonstrated when or under what circumstances the Montgomery fann
would be returned to the Kelleys. In Hettinga, this Court held that there was no
evidence that "in 1984 the parties agreed to when or under what terms the alleged
buy-out would take place;" and that was a reason why the Court did not impose
a result~ggtr~st~5~~~ti~1Z6~I-d~h~tittt47O;-886-P~2dd~tt7775
this matter there was a complete lack of evidence from the Kelleys as to "when

or under what terms" the Montgomery farm would be re-conveyed to the Kelleys.
There was certainly no evidence that the parties had reached an agreement on this
issue at the time of the transaction in 1994.
In fact there was evidence from the Kelley camp that they knew that if
Warren and Kim Yadon got divorced the Montgomery farm would remain with
the Yadons. For instance, evidence from Kitty Kelley - a clearly biased witness
for the Kelleys - suggested that the Kelleys knew in 1994, that the Yadons were
going to keep the farm if they divorced.

She was testifying regarding the

conversation between the Kelleys, Yadons, Kitty Kelley and Todd Phillips that
occurred in Todd Phillips' office on the date that the Montgomery farm was
signed over to the Yadons:
What did you recall was said about the Montgomery place when you
were at Mr. Phillips' office?
Well, do you mean when we signed this agreement?
Either when you signed or any other time. I'm just asking what
conversations you recalled that were at Mr. Phillips' office?
Well, just that we were signing it over and then that Dadwould get
it back.
Did you sign exhibit 6 in Mr. Phillips' office?
Yes, I did. And then I remember a joke after they signed that they
joked that if they got a divorce that they would get to keep it.
He being your dad? Who would keep it?
That Kim and Warren would assume it.
-mtrfcln"tjceeep-it?
Would.

Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 246,ll. 15-25; pg. 247,ll. 1-9. Considering this testimony, at best
there was a clear understanding between the Kelleys and the Yadons at the time
of the transaction that if Kim and Warren got divorced the Yadons would keep the
Montgomery farm. At worst, there is significant confusion as to what the
agreement was between the Kelleys and the Yadons at the time of the transaction,
and there were never facts presented by the Kelleys regarding when and under
what circumstances the farm would be returned to the Kelleys. For the trial court
to make a finding that the evidence was clear and convincing that there was an
intention on the part of the Yadons to hold the property in trust for the Kelleys is
clearly erroneous.
Overall, the facts from Hettinga v. Sybrandy bear a striking resemblance to
the facts produced at trial in this matter, and in Hettinga this Court refused to
impose a resulting trust. It was a misapplication of law and a clearly erroneous
deviation from precedent for the trial court to find that the facts presented by the
Kelleys constituted clear and convincing evidence to establish the elements of
resulting trust. If this Court were to affirm the trial court's decision, it would
place in jeopardy of loss every landlord's holdings wherein he is leasing the

pmperty-"t~-~-t~iran'~o%asagreed-tu-p-ay
,zn-.am-ountcqurrltothea~~derl~ng-mortgage payment and expenses (such as a triple-net lease). The tenant could at
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a whim decide to claim that the landlord is simply holding the property in trust for
him, and request an imposition of resulting trust. The requirement to demonstrate
payment of the purchase price and/or incurring an absolute obligation to pay the
purchase price by a party claiming imposition of a resulting trust provides
protection to property owners from improper imposition of resulting trusts. It is
imperative that this Court enforce that threshold requirement in this case.
2.

The burden of proof on the Kelleys' claim of result in^ trust
was improperly placed upon Warren Yadon.

The burden of proof at trial was upon the Kelleys to prove the elements of
resulting trust by evidence that was "clear, satisfactory and convincing."

See,

Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 469, 886 P.2d at 774. The standard for "clear and

convincing" proof requires more than a vacuum of evidence to the contrary.
The trial court incorrectly shifted the burden of proof to Warren Yadon
when it found "Warren testified that Kelley has not reimbursed the Yadons in full
for payments they made, but presented no financial records or persuasive
docuinentation to establish what payments the Yadons had made, the amounts of
the payments, and no records were apparently kept to substantiate George
Kelley's reimbursement payments to the Yadons." R. Vol. 2, pg. 397. Under the
Kelleys own argument, the burden of proof was on the Kelleys to establish that

they had paid the purchase price by reimbursing each and every semi-annual loan
payment made by the Yadons. George Kelley testified that he paid all of the loan
reimbursement payments to the Yadons, Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 100, 1. 13, and Warren
Yadon testified that the Kelleys had not fully reimbursed the Yadons for loan
payments. R. Vol. 2, pg. 328, 11. 20-25. In the face of that contradictory verbal
testimony, the trial court improperly placed the burden upon Warren Yadon to
come up with "persuasive documentation" to support his testimony. R. Vol. 2, pg.
397. On the contrary, it was the Kelleys' burden to prove that they made all of the
reiinburseinent payments to the Yadons by "clear and convincing evidence."
Therefore, this Court should overturn the trial court's finding of fact on this issue,
and enter a finding that the evidence is contradictory at best and that there is not
clear and convincing evidence to support the Kelleys' position on their flawed
argument that they paid the purchase price by reimbursing the Yadons for the
semi-annual loan payments.
Therefore, even if this Court were to accept the trial court's misapplication
of law regarding the "payment of the purchase price" and find that the Kelleys'
reimbursement of the loan payments to the Yadons constituted payment of the

p~~r~~~~e-p~~c~;~~tkere-i-s-nut-c-~~~nd-m-~nci~~gevide.1~ce-i

establish that the Kelleys reimbursed

all of the loan payments to the Yadons.

Thus, this Court should overturn the trial court's finding.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED WARREN
UADON'S CLAIM FOR EVICTION.

At trial, the court did not get to the issue of eviction. Warren Yadon
requests that this Court overturn the trial court's decisions, and enter an order of
eviction and quiet title in favor of the Yadons.
Plaintiffs have leased the Montgomery Farm since it was purchased by the
Yadons, without a written lease agreement. There was not an agreed upon term
for the lease, and therefore, the plaintiffs are year-to-year tenants. The tenancy
created by a lessor's election to continue a lease following its expiration is a
tenancy at will. Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110 Idaho 640, 718
P.2d 551 (1985). "A tenancy or other estate at will, however created, may be
terminated: (1) By the landlord's giving notice in writing to the tenant, in the
manner prescribed by the code of civil procedure, to remove from the premises
within a prescribed period of not less than one (1) month, to be specified in the
notice

. . .." See, Idaho Code 5 55-208.

"After such notice has been served, and

the period specified by such notice has expired, but not before, the landlord may
--

--

reenter, or proceed according to law to recover possession." See, Idaho Code 5 55209.
In this matter, the Kelleys were personally served with an eviction notice
on September 8,2008. R. Vol. I, pg. 151. More than thirty (30) days have passed
since Kelleys were served with the eviction notice. Therefore, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact on the claim for eviction and this Court should enter
judgment on Warren Yadon's claim of eviction.

VII. ATTORNEY FEES
Warren Yadon is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs as a
prevailing party on appeal pursuant to I.C.

5 12-121; and I.C. 5 6-324.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Warren Yadon respectfully requests that this Court overturn the trial court's
decision denying Warren Yadon's motion for summary judgment and enter an
appropriate order granting the same. In the alternative, Warren Yadon requests
that this Court find as a matter of law that the Kelleys did not incur an "absolute
obligation" to pay the purchase price for the Montgomery farm by verbally
agreeing to pay the Yadoiis' loan payments, and as such, have failed to establish
-elmnts&

re~~1t&g-t1ust~Waf~~e~-ad'on-f~rth~r-re-gu~s~tha~t
enter an order of eviction against the Kelleys. Finally, Warren Yadon requests

that this Court overturn the trial court's award of attorney fees, and enter an award

of costs and fees to Warren Yadon,
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